In this paper, we de ne a rst-order logic CF 0 with strong negation and bounded static quanti ers, which is a variant of Thomason's logic CF. For the logic CF 0 , the usual Kripke formal semantics is de ned based on situations, and a sound and complete axiomatic system is established based on the axiomatic systems of constructive logics with strong negation and Thomason's completeness proof techniques. With the use of bounded quanti ers, CF 0 allows the domain of quanti cation to be empty and allows for non-denoting constants. CF 0 is intended as a fragment of a logic for situation theory. Thus the connection between CF 0 and infon logic is discussed.
, the usual Kripke formal semantics is de ned based on situations, and a sound and complete axiomatic system is established based on the axiomatic systems of constructive logics with strong negation and Thomason's completeness proof techniques. With the use of bounded quanti ers, CF 0 allows the domain of quanti cation to be empty and allows for non-denoting constants. CF 0 is intended as a fragment of a logic for situation theory. Thus the connection between CF 0 and infon logic is discussed.
1 Introduction Thomason 26 ] constructed a rst-order logic CF. In his logic, a constructive negation is used instead of a classical or intuitionistic one. Constructive negation, also called strong negation, was introduced by Nelson 22] following Kleene's notion of recursive realizability, emphasising that false number-theoretic statements as well as true ones are obtained simultaneously by constructive means. Independently, Markov 20 ] also introduced strong negation from the point of view of the constructive logic. Such negation was later incorporated into various logical systems, such as Nelson's propositional systems N and N 1 , that is, the propositional parts of Nelson's system N 1 of constructible falsity (see 22] , and Routley 25] ), 1 
and their
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rst-order extensions (see Almukdad and Nelson 4] ), 2 intuitionistic logic with strong negation H by Gurevich 18] , constructive predicate logic with strong negation S by Akama 2] , and rst-order logic CF in 26] . See also constructive propositional calculus with strong negation by Vorob'ev 30] and the semantics of the calculus in terms of N-lattices in Rasiowa 23] .
Furthermore, Wansing 32] has systematically investigated the whole family of substructural subsystems of Nelson's systems from the point of view of the ne-structure of information processing. 3 The resulting logics, to which we shall refer loosely as constructive logics with strong negation, demonstrate some satisfying features compared with intuitionistic logics. First of all, since negative information is treated as of equal importance with positive information, such logics are more symmetrical than intuitionistic logics and satisfy very natural duality laws. In particular, strong negation avoids non-constructive features possessed by intuitionistic negation (see 18] , and 32]). Secondly, constructive logics with strong negation can be provided with a more satisfying interpretation than the well-known Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov(BHK) interpretation for intuitionistic logics (see 32] , and Lopez- Escobar 19] ). Moreover, they admit a sentence to be undetermined and thus can accommodate the partiality of information (see 26] , and 32]).
Another desirable characteristic of constructive logics with strong negation is the heredity or persistence of information, 4 to the e ect that what is true at a state of information is still true all later states. This is usually bought at the cost of a very strong \dynamic" satisfaction condition on universal quanti ers. A sentence 8x'(x) is true at a state of information s only when '(a) 5 is true at all states of information t s for all individuals a in the domain of t (where orders states by increasing information).
Classically we should evaluate the quanti er in a \static" fashion where only the state s and the individuals in the domain of s are relevant. Which form is more natural from the situation-theoretic viewpoint? Consider the situation s of a room full of people. The sentence \All men here are hungry" will be true at s provided that all the men in the room are hungry. Here the quanti er is taken as restricted to the men in that room. We do not look at wider situations and (possibly) wider extensions of \men". So if we take a point s in a Kripke model as a situation rather than a state of information, then it seems we should evaluate the quanti er statically.
Thomason's rst-order logic CF does interpret universal quanti ers statically rather than dynamically. His semantical model is a hybrid of a Kripke model for propositional intuitionistic logic (as the conditional is intuitionistic) and a classical model for predicate logic (as the universal quanti er is static). 6 Nevertheless, his semantical framework requires di erent stages to have the same domain. From the standpoint which treats stages as situations, it is obvious that this restriction is inappropriate. From an intuitionistic viewpoint, it is not suitable either. As is well-known, Kripke models for intuitionistic logic also require expanding domains. But the connection of intuitionistic logic with expanding domains is both more complicated and more tenuous than is the case with Situation Theory. In order to see this, let us consider the following schema which we call the Distribution Schema: (DS) 8x(' _ (x)) (' _ 8x (x)), where x is not free in '.
If we add to intuitionistic logic all instances of (DS), we obtain a logic whose models are exactly the Kripke models with constant domain. Thus to motivate expanding domains from an intuitionistic viewpoint is to motivate the rejection of this schema. The BHK interpretation is little help. According to that we need to show how a proof of 8x(' _ (x)) could be extended to a proof of ' _ 8x (x) . Well, to have a proof of 8x(' _ (x)) is to have a construction C which transforms a proof of a 2 D (D the intended range of the variable x) into a proof of ' _ (a). If the construction C transforms a proof of a 2 D into a proof of ', then since x is not free in ', we would have a proof of '. Otherwise, it transforms a proof of a 2 D into a proof of (a) and thus from the construction C we derive a proof of 8x (x) . Either way we have a proof of ' _ 8x (x) (for the BHK interpretation, see p. 9 of Troelstra and van Dalen 28] ). The informal semantics of intuitionistic logic does not, at least not obviously, show what is wrong with (DS). Why, then, is (DS) rejected at all? Very brie y, it happens that certain Brouwerian principles of continuity which are more or less self-evident from an intuitionistic standpoint are formally inconsistent in classical logic. These principles say roughly that an assertion about an in nite sequence must be decided by a nite initial segment of , and hence will be decided the same way for all sequences that agree on that initial segment. Adding (DS) to intuitionistic logic will restore inconsistency with these same principles. Dummett 12] contains a treatment of the semantics of intuitionistic logic which discusses these issues in detail.
There is a further point. Kripke models are not the only semantic structures for intuitionistic logic. Beth trees may be used instead. In the Beth semantics we have a more complicated rule (see p. 106 of Troelstra 27] ) for evaluating disjunctions:
This evaluates a disjunction true provided however knowledge is extended eventually one at least of the disjuncts will be true. With this it is easy to nd a counter-example to (DS) that makes no appeal to expanding domains.
The upshot is that expanding domains seem more an artifact of the Kripke semantics than an essential part of the interpretation of intuitionistic logic. However, they are quite central to Situation Theory, which to some extent supports our choice not to use intuitionistic logic as a basis for Situation Theory (for more, see the nal part below)
If The language 7 of our logical system CF 0 consists of an in nite set V L of individual variables (as metavariables for variables we use x; x 0 ; x 1 ; :::), a set C L of individual constants (metavariables: c; c 0 ; c 1 ; :::), and for each n; n 0, a set P n L of n-ary predicate symbols (metavariables: R 1 ; R 2 ; R 3 ; :::). In addition, L has a set B L of bounders with a subset B P L of persistent bounders (metavariables: ; 0 ; 1 ; ::: with or without superscript P), and a relation symbol 2.
The set T L of terms of L is V L C L . We use t; t 0 ; t 1 ; ::: as metavariables for terms.
Atomic formulas of L are R(t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n ) and c2 , where t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n 2 T L ; c 2 C L ; R 2 P n L and 2 B L . The well-formed formulas of L are de ned recursively from atomic formulas using the connectives _; , and , and for each bounder , a bounded universal quanti er 8 as follows:
(i) atomic formulas are formulas;
(ii) if ' is a formula, then so is '; (iii) if '; are formulas, then so are ' _ ; ' ; (iv) if ' is a formula, x is a variable, and is a bounder , then 8 x'(x) is also a formula. For simplicity, we write 8x2 '(x) for 8 x'(x).
A formula of form 8x2 '(x) is called a bounded universally quanti ed formula. Such formulas can be used to express local generality since the bound variables thereof are to range over a subset of the individuals in the universe. In contrast, the generality expressed by unbounded universally quanti ed formulas is a kind of overall generality (see Frege 15] ). In order to express overall generality by a variable, we only need a device for the scope of the variable whereas, in order to express local generality, we need in addition the range of the variable. So, generally speaking, in order to express generality via a variable, we need both a mechanism for the scope of the variable and a parameter for its range. In other words, a logical quantier consists of the scope of a variable and the range of the variable. From the pragmatic point of view, it is clear that bounded formulas are more frequently used than unbounded ones. In translating natural language, restricted quanti ers are usually represented as unrestricted quanti ers over a material conditional or something equivalent. Thus, \All birds y" is formalised as 8x( Bird(x) _ Flies(x)) or 8x(Bird(x) ! Flies(x)) if the material conditional ! is de ned. In CF 0 it is represented as 8x2 Flies(x), where is a bounder for birds. We prefer our approach to the usual one. In our opinion, it is tidy, and emphasises the two aspects of local generality. More importantly, as we mentioned in the introduction, bounded universally quanti ed formulas, can be used to express the persistence of information (see below). That is the primary motive for our use of bounded formulas instead of unbounded ones.
Syntactically bounders are ags on quanti ers. Semantically they are to be interpreted as sets, that is in the same way as predicates are in classical rst-order logic. Then, it may be asked, why do we have a special syntax for bounders instead of treating them simply as unary predicates? The answer is that a predicate such as \Flies(x)" gives three possibilities: an object may y, it may not y, or it may be undecided whether it ies or not. But a bounder supplies only two possibilities: an object is included in the bounder or it is not. The consequence is that 8x( (x) _ '(x)) in fact says a little more than 8x2 '(x) (see Formal Semantics below for exact comparison).
It is the latter that captures the informal reading of \All birds y" rather than the former. Conjunction and bounded existential quanti cation are de ned as follows:
The concept of free and bound variables is de ned as usual. Bound variables are used as position markers only and thus 8x2 '(x) and 8y2 '(y) would be counted as the same formula. We use as above '; ; ; ::: as metavariables for formulas, and ?; (with or without subscripts) for arbitrary sets of formulas.
Persistent Formulas
The concept of persistence comes from situation theory. Informally, it says that what is true in one situation is still true in a larger situation. Formally, there is a so-called persistence principle, stated as If s s 0 and s j = , then s 0 j = , where s; s 0 are situations, is an infon, and j = is a support relation between situations and infons. If an infon satis es the persistence principle, we say that is persistent (see Barwise 5] ). Generally speaking, universally quanti ed sentences in natural language are not persistent. \Everyone here is hungry" may be veri ed when evaluated from the situation in one poor household, but falsi ed when evaluated from a larger situation including comfortable ones. There is a tension between quanti cation and persistence. If we take it that the persistence principle is true of every infon, then it seems universally quanti ed sentences have to be excluded from the category of infons. And conversely, if universally quanti ed sentences are taken as infons then the persistence principle would only hold partially (see pp. 234{236 of 5]). However, quanti ed sentences are such important forms for expressing information that they can hardly be excluded from the category of infons. We also want to retain the persistence principle because, as situation theorists have argued, it captures our intuition \that what goes on in part of the world still goes on when one has a broader perspective"(see p. 236 of 5]).
For the sake of both persistence and a rich algebraic structure of infons, we only consider bounded quanti ed formulas for which these problems do not arise. However, as we pointed out in the introduction, in our present framework, a bounder in 8x2 '(x) may be non-persistent. So we introduce an auxiliary notion of persistent bounders. Syntactically, persistent bounders are treated as a primitive notion. Semantic meaning of persistent bounders will be given below (see condition (iii) on an interpretation in Formal Semantics). Pragmatically, persistent bounders can be obtained by incorporating context into bounders in universally quanti ed sentences. Then we can de ne persistent formulas of L recursively as follows :
(i) R(t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n ) and R(t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n ) are persistent for any n-ary predicate R, terms t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n , and c2 and c2 P are persistent for any bounders and P ;
(ii) if '; are persistent, then so are ' _ and '^ ; (iii) ' is persistent for any formulas '; ; (iv) if ' is persistent, then 8x2 P '(x) is persistent; (v) if ' is persistent, then 9x2 '(x) is persistent for any 2 B L . Given a set ? of formulas, let ? P be f' 2 ? : ' is persistentg. So, all the persistent formulas of L would be F P L , where F L is the set of all L-formulas.
Note that, in the de nition of persistent formulas, negation is restricted to only atomic formulas. Nevertheless, this will not lose any generality since the negation of a compound formula, according to related rules (see Derived
Rules for CF 0 below), is equivalent to another compound formula in which negation is applied to only atomic formulas. By the de nition, non-persistence of formulas is only due to the nonpersistence of bounders in universally quanti ed formulas. So, pragmatically, the persistence of such formulas can be recovered by incorporating context into related bounders. Nevertheless, there exists indeed a kind of unrecoverable non-persistence. In fact, such non-persistence is the consequence of the partiality of situations. If a situation is silent on then it certainly does not preclude a larger more extensive situation settling . In order to express the unrecoverable non-persistence, we need to add a kind of modal operators such as \de nitely" into our language. Such an extension, however, is outside the scope of this paper (for more, see Mott 21] ).
The syntactic de nition of persistence will be used in Derived Rules for CF 0 below.
Formal Semantics
Our semantical analysis is essentially similar to Thomason' Clause (iii) in the de nition of interpretation gives us the semantic meaning of persistent sets. In other words, it is the semantic requirement for a set of individuals to be persistent. It is worth pointing out the restriction incorporated in (iii) is compatible with the situation theoretic viewpoint though it may look ad hoc. Anyway, situations are treated as rst-class citizens in situation theory. So, one possible way to ensure the persistence of universal quanti ed formulas would be to incorporate reference to situations into them (see p. 236 of 5]). In this paper, however, we instead adopt the device of persistent bounders.
A Kripke model M is a pair < F; I > consisting of a Kripke frame F and an interpretation I on F.
Before we continue the formulation of formal semantics, some remarks seem in order about the de nition of Kripke models. First, note that, in a Kripke model M = < S; ; D; I >, D(s) can be empty for any (and all) s 2 S. The use of bounders means that the usual restriction to non-empty domains is unnecessary. Thus CF 0 is inclusive in the sense that it allows the domain of quanti cation to be empty (see pp. 379-382 of Bencivenga 9] ).
Second, note that the function I s C L is partial. So CF 0 allows for nondenoting constants as a free logic does (see 9]). In a free logic, an extra unary predicate E or something equivalent is introduced to deal with reference failure. Nevertheless, in CF 0 , we do not need such a special predicate.
Bounders of quanti ers can play the role of the predicate E of free logic. It may be that bounders are preferable to an existence predicate, at least if one wishes to con ne existence to a purely semantic role (as we would).
Anyway, it will be no surprise that some axioms and inference rules of CF 0 will correspond to axioms and inference rules of a free logic.
Next, note that the function I s P n L (n 0) is also partial. That is to say, it may be the case that a basic sentence R(c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c n ) is neither true nor false, so CF 0 allows truth value gaps. Such gaps may arise from the use of inexact predicates, but we emphasise that there is another source of truth value gaps { the partiality of situations.
When a predicate has truth value gaps, we call it a partial predicate, otherwise a total predicate. A total predicate can be interpreted as a set, that is in the same way as predicates are in classical rst-order logic. With partial predicates, however, we have to associate two sets: one is for the positive assertions, the other for the strong negative assertions. So we might as well divide a partial predicate into two parts, a positive part corresponding to the positive assertions, and a negative part corresponding to the strong negative assertions. We recall that, syntactically, bounders are ags on quanti ers. Semantically, as can be seen from the clause (iii) in the de nition of interpretation, bounders are interpreted as sets. What sets, then, should we associate with a bounder ? There are two natural candidates. We could say that was assigned all the objects in the current situation. Then 8x2 '(x) would be supported by s provided that s made true '(a) for each object a in D(s). In this case, bounder is nothing more than a denotational variant of the existential predicate E of free logic (see pp. 251-252, Garson 16] ). An alternative would see bounders in a more restricted way as corresponding to the positive parts of particular predicates, so that 8x2 '(x) would be interpreted as asserting of all the objects that were in the current situation that they were also '. In fact, we choose here not to restrict bounders beyond requiring that the objects a bounder is associated with in a situation s are all objects that belong to the situation s. 
Axiomatic System for CF 0
Our axiomatic system CF 0 is based on the axiomatic systems for constructive logics with strong negation (see 25] , 18], and 2]). It takes as axioms the following list of schemas:
In axioms A1 and A5, ' P means that ' has to be persistent, which is the little price we have to pay for the relaxation of the dynamic condition on universal quanti ers to the static one. In axiom A12, x is required not to be free in '. In addition, note that axiom A12 is not assumed in constructive logics (see 18], and 2]). We emphasise our situation theoretical standpoint rather than intuitionistic or constructive viewpoint. So there seems nothing preventing us from assuming the axiom.
With axiom A19, we are assuming that, at any situation, we can always decide if a constant c is in or not. The assumption is consistent with the semantic interpretation of given above. In addition, note that axioms A13 and A18 can in fact be derived from the other axioms and related de nitions, and thus can be omitted.
CF 0 has the following inference rules:
In rules R2 and R3, the constant c is required not to occur in . The axiomatic system CF 0 is a rst-order modi cation of Almukdad and Nelson's N as well as Thomason's CF. 9 If we delete axiom A9 from CF 0 , denoted CF 0? , then we have a system which is a modi cation of Almukdad and Nelson's N ? . Since axiom A9 is not available in CF 0? , we need another axiom to the e ect that c2 and c2 do not hold at the same time, say c2 ^ c2 ?. So, with logic CF 0? , inconsistent situations are allowed, but the inconsistency of situations does not arise from the contradictory statements of form c2 ^ c2 .
Basic notions (relative to CF 0 ) such as thesishood, consequence, and consistency can be de ned in the usual way. For any sentence ', and set ? of sentences, we write`' to indicate that ' is a thesis of CF 0 , ?`' to indicate that ' is a consequence in CF 0 of ?, and ?` to indicate that there is a subset f' 1 ; ' 2 ; :::; ' n g of such that ' 1 _ ' 2 _ ::: _ ' n is a consequence of ?.
From the de nition of thesishood and consequence, it is easy to prove the following lemma. In this section, we list some rules for the deducibility-relation`of CF 0 between sets of L-sentences that are needed in the proof of semantical completeness. It is not di cult to derive them from the axioms and rules of CF 0 given before. We divide these rules into three groups. Group I consists of two structural rules, and group II some operational rules. For CF 0? , rule E is to be replaced by a rule equivalent to c2 ^ c2 ?. Group Proof. Proof is routine and thus omitted.
Note that the soundness of CF 0 would fail if we included a rule ofintroduction ( -I) to the e ect that from ?; '` we can infer ?` '; . To see this, observe that, by derived rule R of CF 0 , '`'. By -I it then follows that` '; '. And so` ' _ ' by rule _-I. But it is not di cult to see that ' _' is not valid in the current semantic framework. This shows that -I is not sound in CF 0 . To de ne ? k+1 and k+1 , we distinguish the following ve cases.
Case 1. k = 4n, ? k`'n;1 _ ' n;2 , and ' n;1 6 2 ? k and ' n;2 6 2 ? k . Put ? k+1 = ? k f' n;i g; k+1 = k ; where i is the least of f1; 2g such that ? k f' n;i g 6 k . Case 2. k = 4n + 1. ? k` 8x2 n ' n (x); k and for all constants c 2 C L 0 , (c2 n^ ' n (c)) 6 2 ? k . Put ? k+1 = ? k fc k 2 n^ ' n (c k )g; k+1 = k ; where c k is the rst member of C L 0 not to occur in ' n (x) or in any member of ? k or of k .
Case 3. k = 4n + 2, there are two subcases.
Case 3.1. ? k ; ' n` k . Put ? k+1 = ? k ; k+1 = k f' n g; Case3.2. ' n 6 2 ? k and ? k ; ' n 6 k . Put ? k+1 = ? k f' n g; k+1 = k : Case 4. k = 4n + 3. ? k ; 8x2 n ' n (x)` k , and for all constants c 2 C L 0 , ( c2 n _ ' n (c)) 6 2 k . Put ? k+1 = ? k ; k+1 = k f c k 2 n _ ' n (c k )g; where c k is the rst member of C L 0 not to occur in ' n (x) or in any member of ? k or of k . Case 5. None of the cases above applies, put ? k+1 = ? k ; k+1 = k : It is then not di cult to check by induction that for any k 2 !, ? k 6 k using the derived rules for CF 0 . To illustrate, let us consider case 3.1. We need to show that if ? k ; ' n` k , then ? k 6 k f' n g. Suppose ? k` k f' n g. We assume that ' n ; k and k f' n g are the same set of formulas. By rule T and rule _I, we have ? k 6 ' n _ ' n ; k . Since we are assuming that ? k ; ' n` k , it follows that ? k` k by rule _E. But this contradicts the induction hypothesis. So we have ? k 6 k f' n g. 
De nition (Canonical Model Construction)
Let C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 ; ::: be a countable sequence of disjoint countable sets of constants foreign to L. Let C n be C 1 C 2 ::: C n , and B n a set of bounders of L C n such that B l B m for any l m n. Then Conversely, suppose ' 6 2 ?, then ' 6 2 ? P , so ? P f'g 6 by rule I. Using the Saturation Lemma II, we can get a saturated set 2 S such that ?
; ' 2 , but 6 2 . By the hypothesis of induction, we get j = ' but 6 j = . Thus ? 6 j = ' . 
Conclusion and Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is the proposal of a rst-order logic, which is based on constructive logic with strong negation. However, di erent from constructive logic, quanti ers in our system as in Thomason' s are static rather than dynamic. Our intention is to develop CF further so that it can serve as a logic for situation theory.
Originally, situation theorists were not much concerned with developing their own logical systems. Their semantic theory of consequence emphasised the external signi cance of language and the role of non-linguistic contexts. Consequence is for them no longer a relation between syntactic elements. There is no exact correspondence between the information conveyed by an utterance and the sentence used to convey. In fact \... there can be no syntactic counterpart, of the kind traditionally sought in proof theory and theories of logical form, to the situation] semantic theory of consequence." (see pp. 44-45 of Barwise and Perry 8] ). However the desire to use situation theory and situation semantics to give an account of inference eventually led Barwise and Etchemendy to construct a situation theoretical model of inference, emphasising information content. They called this infon logic; that is a logic whose elementary formulas represent items of information and whose compounds correspond to ways of compounding those items (see Barwise and Etchemendy 7] , 11]).
An infon algebra I = < Sit; I; ); j => consists of a non-empty collection Sit of situations, a distributive lattice < I; )> on infons, together with the makes-factual or support relation j = between situations and infons satisfying certain additional conditions.
In an infon algebra I, infons represent pieces of information, and situations are intended to be limited portions of the world. The support relation j = is essentially partial: a situation may support some infons and refute others but remains silent on many. It follows that any algebraic theory of infons is de nitely not Boolean. Furthermore, they argue that a situation theoretical model of infons is at least a complete distributive lattice, that is a Heyting algebra. Thus the logic for situation theory is at least intuitionistic but not classical.
This argument immediately poses at least two questions. One of them is about negation, the other about the interpretation of quanti ers. Let us rst consider the question about negation. We recall that in situation theory there are two kinds of basic infons:
one is R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 1 , the other R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 0 , where R is an n-place relation, a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n are objects with the restriction of appropriateness. Note that a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n need not necessarily be individuals. 0 and 1 are the polarity of infons. For basic infons, negation is de ned through a dual operation as follows:
R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 1 = R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 0
R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 0 = R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 1
So, we have R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 1 = R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 1
R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 1 = R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; 1
However, it is well-known that intuitionistic negation does not satisfy (3) though it satis es (4). Furthermore, the negation of compound infons in situation theory is de ned by the following version of DeMorgan's laws (see p. 235 of 5], and p. 108 of Fernando 13] 
Therefore, we conclude that situation theoretic negation is not intuitionistic. Moreover, the above way of treating negation by situation theorists to some extent suggests that the negation used in situation theory is in fact strong negation. More importantly, we can put aside the question whether situation theoretic negation is intuitionistic or strong since it turns out that intuitionistic negation can in fact be simulated by strong negation (see 20] and 2]). Now we consider the question of quanti ers. Quanti cation of infons is not treated in Barwise and Etchemendy's infon algebra. Presumably, they would not interpret quanti ers dynamically for the reasons we discussed previously. Moreover, quanti ers in related situation theoretical literature are interpreted in one way or another statically rather than dynamically (see p. 271 of 5], pp. 134-136 of 11], and p. 109 of 13]).
Therefore, we are inclined to use constructive negation, more generally, to use constructive logic with strong negation as the underlying logic for situation theory but to interpret quanti ers statically instead of dynamically. That is the way we arrive at the logic CF' from situation theorists' work on infon logic. However, we do not claim that our logic is fully-edged. For one thing, the components in a basic formula R(a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ), or using the notation of infon logic, R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; i are still individuals whereas infon logic allows them to be any objects. Nevertheless, we do intend to claim that our logic preserves many features of infon logic since (i) CF 0 is partial in the sense that a formula can be neither true nor false; (ii) It has a rich algebraic structure of persistent formulas; (iii) With strong negation available, CF 0 has in fact two kinds of basic formulas very similar to the two kinds of basic infons of situation theory; (iv) The negation of compound formulas satis es DeMorgan's laws which are assumed to hold in situation theory; (iv) Quanti ers in CF 0 are static, as is consistent with situation theoretical interpretation of quanti ers.
CF 0 can be extended in many ways. A natural extension is to replace basic formulas R(a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ) of CF 0 with basic infons R; a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n ; i , emphasising that components a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n in basic infons can be any objects not just individuals. Such structures lend themselves to the treatment of complex objects.
Another possible extension is to incorporate an operator into CF 0 in order to express non-persistence. 10 and denial(see Barwise and Etchemendy 6] ). However, our approach is radically di erent from Barwise and Etchemendy's. Among other things, the inclusion of U in our logic will lead us into non-monotonic logic whereas
Barwise and Etchemendy claim that \Closing the class of propositions under conjunction, disjunction, and denial would result in a notion of proposition whose logic is entirely classical."(see p. 169 of 6]). Full details of such an extension remain to be done.
In addition to the foundational role for situation theory, CF 0 may have potential applications in database theory. In database theory, we are con-cerned with what information we can get from a query to a database. Since data in relational databases are all positive, we have to use the closed world assumption(CWA) (see Reiter 24] ) to obtain negative information. For complete databases, CWA is e cient. However, databases often provide us with just an incomplete description of the world. As a result, the use of CWA may give rise to unpleasant consequences (see p. 282 of Abiteboul, Hull and Vianu 1]). Thus, much e ort has been devoted to ways of dealing with various kinds of negative information. Among other things, it is argued that strong negation is necessary in many important applications (see 31] and Alferes and Pereira 3] 11 ). Moreover, there is a more general problem to be considered. It is well known that the relational model for database theory is based on rst-order logic. However, such a logical foundation is perhaps inappropriate . First of all, the principle of excluded middle is no longer valid when databases are incomplete. Second, though it is always desirable to have the principle of noncontradiction, we certainly do not want the destructive consequences that propositional logic gives. Indeed, from informational point of view, it is obvious that the inferential rule of form p^ p ! q should always be rejected. As a result, what remains is at most the constraints of form p^ p ! ?. So it is worth seeking a modi ed foundation for database theory. 5: Hereafter, we use a as a name for a.
6: It should be pointed out that his model for propositional logic, strictly speaking, is not intuitionistic since the falsity of an atomic sentence at a stage of construction is treated as being discovered directly rather than being decided by later stages. 7: Function symbols introduce nothing new. For simplicity, we avoid them here. 8: We are assuming that every object has a name. In e ect we work with the expansion of language L to accommodate all the objects of all the domains.
9: Note that neither N nor CF is formulated in axiomatic formalism.
10: Readers are invited to refer to Veltman's paper Defaults in Update Semantics 29]. There he introduces operators like`presumably' to deal with non-persistence within the framework of update semantics. 11: In 3], exactly speaking, Alferes and Pereira use explicit negation instead of strong negation.
